

# **Discussion of Marvin Goodfriend's**

## **“I Pull No Punches Essay”**

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and  
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## **Three Contributions**

- Introduce a taxonomy of policy
- Provide a diagnosis of the crisis of 2007–2009
- Articulate principles of Fed-Treasury interactions

## **My Discussion**

- Think taxonomy useful
- Find diagnosis may well be right
- Set out alternative principles
- Provide data for improving academic research

## Diagnosis

- Marvin suggests Fed/Treasury converted a somewhat worse than garden variety recession into a full-blown Great Recession
- Speculative, of course
- Just as speculative as “We will not have an economy on Monday if Congress does not pass this bill.”
- Need cross-country evidence

## Theory Behind Principles

- Interest on reserves good idea
  - Gets us closer to Friedman Rule
- Credit allocation policy dangerous
- Fed getting into fiscal policy undermines independence

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- Interest on reserves good idea
  - Gets us closer to Friedman Rule
- Credit allocation policy dangerous
- Fed getting into fiscal policy undermines independence
  - Is Fed's independence gone for good?

# Principles

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- We solemnly promise not to get into credit allocation
  - Except when the Great Depression monster lurks under our beds
- Message from Fed to Treasury: Take these assets away
- We will all cooperate
- We will not inflate too much
- Everyone gets interest on reserves
- We will all cooperate

## The Logic Behind My Principles

- No commitment technology: Bailouts will happen
- Government bailouts create externalities
- Private agents will not internalize these externalities
- Ex-ante regulation should focus on reducing costs of bailout externalities

## **Translating Logic into Principles for Policy**

- Ask when governments will bail out
- Ask how anticipated bailouts will affect private discussions
- Tailor policies to alter private decisions
- Lots of short-term debt makes bailouts necessary
- Costly bankruptcy makes bailouts necessary

## **Principles for Policy**

- Impose limits on short-term debt
- Force long-term/uninsured debt to be convertible to equity
- Make money market mutual funds truly into mutual funds

## **What Academics Need to Think About**

- How important is access to financial markets for firms' investment decisions?
- What business are banks in, anyway?

# **Importance of Financial Market Access**

## **Key Ingredients in Many Financial Friction Models** \_\_\_\_\_

- Typical firm needs external funds to finance investment
- Agency costs induce wedge between internal and external funds
- Binding collateral constraints
- Fluctuations in wedge/constraint affect investment in a big way

## Does Typical Firm Use External Funds to Finance Investment?


- Use data from Flow of Funds for all nonfinancial corporations
- Available Funds (AF) = Revenues – Wages – Materials  
– Interest payments – Taxes
- In Flow of Funds,  $AF = \text{Internal funds} + \text{Dividends}$   
Alternatively,  $AF = \text{Retained earnings} + \text{Dividends}$   
+ Depreciation
- In Flow of Funds use Gross Investment for Capital expenditure

## Does Typical Firm Use External Funds to Finance Investment?

- Available Funds – Dividends + Net new debt issue  
+ Net new equity issue  
= Capital expenditure
- Suppose Net new debt issue = 0  
Net new equity issue = 0
- That is, firms lose access to financial markets
- Can they finance all investment internally?

# Available Funds and Capital Expenditures


Source: Flow of Funds and BEA



Data for U.S. Nonfinancial Corporations


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


Data for U.S. Nonfinancial Corporations

# Noninterest Flow from Households to Firms, Source: Flow of Funds and BEA.



### Noninterest Flows From Households To Firms



Source: Federal Reserve Board, <http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/>

## **Does Typical Firm Use External Funds to Finance Investment?**

- No, for aggregate of U.S. corporations
- Financial markets may play a big role in reallocating funds from cash-rich, project-poor firms to cash-poor, project-rich firms
- Use disaggregated data to analyze reallocation

## Does Typical Firm Use External Funds to Finance Investment?

- Use data from Compustat
- Compute available funds for each firm, each time period
- $AF_{it}$  = Available funds for firm  $i$  in period  $t$
- $I_{it}$  = Gross investment by firm  $i$  in period  $t$
- How much would  $I_{it}$  fall if no firm can invest more than  $AF_{it}$


# Does Typical Firm Use External Funds to Finance Investment?

- Use of external funds to finance investment

$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \frac{\sum_i ((I_{it} - AF_{it}) | I_{it} > AF_{it})}{\sum_i I_{it}}$$


- In data, financial market constraints = 16% of investment financed by external funds
- Interpretation: If firms had no access to financial markets, investment would have fallen by 16%
- This is exceptionally extreme exercise

## Available Funds and Capital Expenditure Relative to Corporate GDP




## Available Funds and Capital Expenditure Relative to Corporate GDP, Firms Not Using External Funds

Source: COMPUSTAT and BEA




## Available Funds and Capital Expenditure Relative to Corporate GDP, Firms Using External Funds

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# Fraction of Firms Using External Funds


Source: COMPUSTAT



## Fraction of Investment Financed by External Funds

Source: COMPUSTAT

Sample Average = .16



**Are Banks Special?**

## Are Banks Special?


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- Banks have lots of short-term debt
- More so than pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies
- Diamond-Dybvig: Technology differences for short- and long-run projects, liquidity shocks
- Popular story: Incentive problems in managing financial assets, can change risk easily. Need short-term debt to discipline managers


## **Are Banks Special?**

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- Yes, in terms of liabilities
- Not so much in terms of assets




**Banks hold lots of mortgages**




**Loans smaller fraction of bank assets**

# Securities Relative to Bank Credit

Source: Flow of Funds



**Large decline in publicly traded securities**



**Banks not only holders of mortgages**